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[T]wo broad trends, globalization and
information technology, are undermining
the old order, forcing business to restruc-
ture. ... These trends can combine in
powerful ways to raise Americans’ stan-
dard of living, create jobs, spur entrepre-
neurial effort—and do all this without
boosting inflation. To the believers in the
New Economy, we have here the magic
bullet—a way to return to the high-
growth, low-inflation conditions of the
1950s and 1960s. Forget 2% real
growth. We’re talking 3%, or even 4%.1
Stephen B. Shepard, editor-in-chief,
Business Week
Optimism abounds. Just look at indi-
cators like consumer sentiment and the
stock market. The good feelings partly
reflect the persistent underlying strength
of the U.S. economy, which surprised
many observers by expanding almost 
4 percent in the last 12 months. Over the
past two years, the economy grew at an
average annual rate of more than 3.5 per-
cent, clear evidence for Stephen Shepard
that a “New Economy” is here. No econ-
omy, however, can sustain a more rapid
expansion than this unless its workforce
continues to grow quickly or its workers
become increasingly productive. Given
that employment is expected to grow
around 1 percent, Shepard’s view implies
that trend productivity growth must more
than double the 1.2 percent average rate
it posted during the past 25 years.2
The New Economy’s detractors, though
surprised by the recent surge in eco-
nomic activity, point to measures of pro-
ductivity—most often labor productiv-
ity, computed as the ratio of real output
to hours worked.3  They note that over
the recent expansion, labor productivity
has not grown noticeably faster than its
post-1973 trend rate. Meanwhile, advo-
cates like Mr. Shepard counter that our
ways of measuring productivity under-
state its true gains.
It is quite likely that productivity has
been and continues to be understated.
But so what? If the point is to explain the
unusual combination of low inflation and
high growth, then an appeal to mismea-
sured productivity is no help at all. Cor-
recting the measurement problem just
means that inflation is even lower and
growth even higher.4
The real question at hand is whether
mismeasurement has masked an in-
crease in trend output growth.5  To
answer it, we must establish that meas-
urement difficulties are generating an
ever larger bias over time. This Eco-
nomic Commentary carefully develops
several possible explanations for the
underestimation of productivity growth
in order to evaluate the effects of each
on output and inflation.
n n Measuring Productivity
Although the concept of labor produc-
tivity (real output per hour of work) is
simple, the published number is the
result of some challenging calculations.6
Measuring real output requires com-
puting both the total dollar output in the
domestic economy (nominal GDP) and 
a corresponding price index to convert
the nominal measure to a real (that is,
inflation-adjusted) value.7
Conventional measures of nominal GDP
try to sum the value added of all busi-
nesses and households, a calculation that
requires collecting highly detailed infor-
mation on diverse production processes.
Real GDP is computed by dividing nom-
inal GDP by prices, which are generally
collected using survey methods.
Productivity can be calculated for the
aggregate economy or for particular sec-
tors or industries. We have selected non-
farm business sector productivity, the
most widely cited measure. Earlier in
this decade, much attention was focused
on the fact that this measure’s growth
rate declined sometime around 1973.
Between the second quarter of 1960 and
the third quarter of 1973, nonfarm busi-
ness productivity increased at an annual
rate of 3.0 percent. Since then, the same
measure has increased at an average
annual rate of 1.1 percent. A large body
of literature, some of it relevant to the
current debate, has tried to assess how
far mismeasurement could account for
the slowdown.8
June 1998
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Productivity Measures and the 
“New Economy”
by John B. Carlson and Mark E. Schweitzer
The U.S. economy’s extraordinary
performance in recent years has led
many observers to claim we are wit-
nessing a “New Economy,” in which
trend output growth has accelerated
to a much higher rate than any we
have experienced over the past quar-
ter century. They also argue that
measurement problems have masked
the signs of productivity’s accelera-
tion. We find scant evidence to sup-
port such claims.
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Nominal Output 
The first possible source of error we con-
sider is the official measure of nominal
output, gross domestic product. GDP is
derived by summing the dollar value of
expenditures on consumption, invest-
ment, government purchases, and net
export values. It is conceivable that some
nominal expenditures are not recorded.
As a cross-check, we can compute GDP
by adding up measured income, includ-
ing rents, interest payments, and divi-
dends. These data are obtained from al-
ternative sources, including the IRS. In
fact, the Commerce Department’s Bu-
reau of Economic Activity (BEA) cal-
culates both expenditure-based and
income-based measures. Though it des-
ignates the expenditure-based measure as
the official one, the BEA publishes the
discrepancy between the two (figure 1).
As the recent swing in the statistical
discrepancy shows, the official, 
expenditure-based measure has been
increasing less rapidly in the 1990s. The
implications for nonfarm business pro-
ductivity are illustrated in figure 2.
Since the last business-cycle peak, the
income-based measure has expanded
about 0.2 percent faster annually than
the official one. 
While many consider this difference
significant, it is important to remember
that the income-based measure itself is
not perfect. The BEA, for example,
must estimate unreported income. As
new data become available, both the
income and the product accounts are
revised, which typically reduces the dis-
crepancy. Thus, it is likely that the early
income-based measure overstates true
output. For example, with scanty infor-
mation on which side of the accounts is
more accurate, the Council of Economic
Advisers assumes that nominal output
mismeasurement understates productiv-
ity growth by half the difference implied
by the discrepancy (0.1 percent by our
calculation).
n n Mismeasuring Prices 
Although most economists appreciate
the difficulties associated with measur-
ing prices, their estimates of the degree
of mismeasurement vary widely. A spe-
cial commission on the consumer price
index (CPI) was formed in 1995 to eval-
uate the nation’s price statistics. It con-
cluded that the change in the CPI over-
states the cost of living by 1.1 percent-
age points per year (with a plausible
range of 0.8 to 1.6 percentage points).
The commission also recommended a
number of procedural changes, some of
which were already in the works.9
Since 1995, the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics has made several methodological
changes to reduce measurement bias.
Table 1 reports the implication of past
and proposed changes to improve the
accuracy of the CPI. Significantly, the
percentage-point effects are not of the
same magnitude for changes in the CPI
and in productivity. The potential for
mismeasuring the CPI has garnered the
most attention, but the GDP price index,
which is used to calculate nonfarm pro-
ductivity, is based on much the same
underlying data as the CPI and so is sub-
ject to some of the same criticisms. Gen-
erally, improvements that reduce the
measured change in the CPI will raise
the measured growth rate of real GDP
(and hence productivity) to a lesser
extent. The reasons for this are, first, that
procedures for deflating nominal GDP
may already incorporate new methods;
and, second, that most investment goods
are not affected by changes in the CPI. 
The new methods reduce CPI “bias” by
more than two-thirds of a percentage
point, but reduce productivity “bias” by
less than one-quarter of a percentage
point. These estimates suggest that
methodological improvements account
for very little of the increase in measured
productivity over the past two years.
Although the CPI bias may be substan-
tial, few of its sources could account for
an increasing bias in measured produc-
tivity. Rather, as table 1 shows, efforts to
eliminate the sources of price bias have
already reduced the bias in productivity
measurement.10
Why does this matter? We compare eco-
nomic statistics to their historical pat-
terns to establish what levels we should
expect. Statements that we have achieved
a new economic order imply that our cur-
rent status has improved, yet even a very
large bias would do nothing to support
this claim (if it has always been there).
Eliminating the biases in national price
indexes will raise productivity estimates
moderately over the coming years. How-
ever, it is doubtful that these biases have
hidden the rise of a New Economy: The
fact that problems have been addressed
over the years suggests that today’s bias
is probably no bigger than in earlier peri-
ods. Indeed, it may even be smaller.
n n The Unmeasurable Sector
Alternatively, the issue of correct price
measurement can be viewed as a prob-
lem concentrated in the service sector.
The key industries cited in many ac-
counts of the New Economy are those
involved in information technology, pri-
marily in the service sector. Unfortu-
nately, it is inherently difficult to meas-
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Economic Statistics; and U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.ure changes in quality—and hence con-
sistent price changes—in this sector.
The service producers’ share of total
employment has risen from 60 percent in
1950 to 80 percent today. Even since
1990, the share has gone up 3 percentage
points. This development might imply
that productivity was increasingly under-
stated over time as the least measurable
producers came to represent a larger and
larger share of the economy.11
To assess the plausibility of applying this
explanation to the current business cycle,
we calculate a hypothetical measure of
productivity which assumes that manu-
facturing—a well-measured sector—
maintains its share of output. Figure 3
compares this calculation with nonfarm
business productivity since the second
quarter of 1990. The hypothetical mea-
sure increases 0.46 percentage point
faster at an average annual rate than that
of nonfarm business productivity. 
If anything, our hypothetical example
sets an upper bound on the potential con-
tribution of an increasingly unmeasur-
able gap. It assumes that during an in-
vestment boom, productivity growth in
the more expansive service sector is as
high as that in manufacturing. There are
reasons to suspect that manufacturing’s
productivity growth may have been
exceptional, given that sector’s booming
capital expenditures.12  Thus, our esti-
mate suggests that more precise meas-
ures of the service sector would add no
more than half a percent to productivity
growth. Though this is substantial, it
won’t generate a 4 percent trend growth
rate. Note that the issue remains the dif-
ficulty of measuring price appropriately
and is thus not independent of general
price mismeasurement estimates.
n n    Conclusion
The performance of the U.S. economy in
recent years has been extraordinary.
Since 1995 we have witnessed rapid out-
put growth, declining inflation, falling
unemployment, and record profit
growth. This favorable constellation of
events has convinced some observers
that structural changes like globalization
and information technology develop-
ments have created a new era in which
we can expect a permanently higher tra-
jectory for U.S. output growth. To be
sure, the recent stellar performance was
not widely anticipated, which suggests
that the received wisdom about the po-
tential economic growth rate may have
been too pessimistic. Nevertheless,
when we look at productivity growth for
the current expansion to date, things do
not look so exceptional.
Some advocates argue that the mismeas-
urement of productivity has masked the
arrival of the New Economy. Our as-
sessment, however, does not suggest
that improved measures would have
shown productivity growth accelerating
much more sharply, either recently or in
the future. Thus, we conclude that the
mismeasurement hypothesis is a weak
reed to lean on when arguing that the
economy is on a permanently higher
path of growth.
By the same token, our assessment does
not indicate that the present favorable
conditions are about to end. Although
financial crises in Asia may cloud the
horizon, the domestic economy contin-
ues to be robust.13  However, if we are
truly experiencing a New Economy, then
productivity should accelerate on a con-
sistently measured basis. Whether this
will happen remains to be seen. 
n n Footnotes
1.  See Stephen B. Shepard, “The New Econ-
omy: What It Really Means,” Business Week,
November 17, 1997, p. 39.
2.  This figure is based on an assumed annual
rate of employment growth (1.25 percent)
consistent with long-run population growth
and labor-force participation rates.
3. The points made in this Economic Com-
mentary could also be demonstrated in terms
of total factor productivity, but we chose to
focus on labor productivity, a less compli-
cated measure.
4.  The issue has been compared to measuring
a car’s speed with a broken speedometer (see
Paul Krugman, “Speed Trap: The Fuzzy
Logic of the ‘New Economy,’” Slate Maga-
zine at www.slate.com/Dismal/97-12-18/
dismal.asp [posted December, 18, 1997]).
When you find that your speedometer is
understating velocity by, say, 10 miles an
hour, does this mean that your car suddenly
accelerates? Clearly not, though your percep-
tion of the car’s speed may have changed. A
fixed, uncorrected degree of productivity
measurement error cannot help explain
today’s good economic news, which is
already incorporated in today’s productivity
Percentage point effect
on percent change in
Change in method Year introduced CPI Productivity
Pre-1998 –0.28 0.06
Generic prescription drugs 1995 –0.01 0.0
New food products 1995 –0.04 0.0
Owner’s equivalent rent formula 1995 –0.10 0.0
Rent composite estimator 1995 0.03 0.0
New products 1996 –0.10 0.6
Hospital services index 1997 –0.06 0.0
1998 and after –0.41 0.14
Personal computer hedonics 1998 –0.06 0.00
Updated market basket 1998 –0.15 0.02
Geometric means 1999 –0.15 0.09
Rotation of items 1999 –0.05 0.03
Total –0.69 0.20
SOURCES: President’s Council of Economic Advisers; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics; and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.




SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics; and authors’
calculations.estimate. Moreover, only the change in the
measurement error is relevant for compar-
isons to historical periods that very likely
were also mismeasured.
5.  It is unclear whether projections by New
Economy advocates are based on measure-
ment catching up with reality or an underly-
ing but unmeasurable expansion. Either way,
accelerating growth camouflaged by poor
measurement is the argument’s linchpin.
6. There’s relatively little controversy about
measuring total employment or average hours.
Each series is compiled from at least two inde-
pendent surveys in a way that allows cross-
checking for accuracy. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) collects hours data from a
sample of business establishments (Current
Employment Statistics Survey) and a sample
of households (Current Population Survey).
Most of the employment and hours informa-
tion used in the productivity measures is
derived from the establishment survey, but the
BLS often compares the two surveys’ results.
7. The published nonfarm business produc-
tivity number excludes several hard-to-
measure sectors of the economy that are
included in the official GDP tally.
8. See for example, Zvi Griliches, “Produc-
tivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, vol. 84, no. 1 (March
1994), pp. 1–23.  
9. The Commission’s findings are reported
in the May 1997 issue of the American Eco-
nomic Review. Others have arrived at lower
(and a few at higher) estimates. See, for
example, Michael F. Bryan and Stephen G.
Cecchetti, “The CPI as a Measure of Infla-
tion,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Review, vol. 29, no. 4 (Quarter 4
1993), pp. 15–24.
10. Bryan and Cecchetti (see footnote 9)
estimate that CPI bias has declined substan-
tially since 1981.
11. Griliches (see footnote 8) originated this
argument to explain the productivity slow-
down after 1973. See also Daniel E. Sichel,
“The Productivity Slowdown: Is a Growing
Unmeasurable Sector the Culprit?” Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 79, no. 3
(August 1997), pp. 367–9. Sichel estimates
that only about 0.23 percent of the productiv-
ity slowdown between 1973 and 1990 can be
attributed to this phenomenon.
12.  Note that our calculation includes all
services, not simply those focused on infor-
mation technologies. It has frequently been
remarked that for many service-sector work-
ers, such as barbers and classical musicians,
technology yields few productivity gains.
13. Even though the current business cycle
has not shown exceptional rates of produc-
tivity growth, its endurance is remarkable.
For a comparison, see Mark E. Schweitzer,
“Productivity Gains during Business Cycles:
What’s Normal?” Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Economic Commentary, forth-
coming.
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